

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

MENTORING: AN EXTENSION OF
AC/RC INTEGRATION

by

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ABSTRACT

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The lack of cross-component mentoring can effect AC/RC integration. Both the Active Component and the Reserve Components have an inherent responsibility to the military profession, continued AC/RC integration, and mentor across their respective components. The use of reserve forces to sustain combat operations has always been a natural strength of our military power that began with local militia and reserves that assisted General George Washington during the Revolutionary War. Both components bring unique perspectives and capabilities to the "Total Force" that go beyond sheer technological combat power to the finer elements of the civil-military relationship that symbolizes our national values. The integration of the active and reserve forces balances war time capabilities, while also operating with less funding, has led to an efficient combat force and a very effective element of national power. Maintaining this capable force into the future will require a symbiotic relationship between the Active and Reserve Components. Current mentoring programs that assume an "Army of One" relationship need to be expanded to include cross-component mentoring. As with all mentoring, both the mentor and the protégé, regardless of initiating component, will benefit from this professional developmental relationship.

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MENTORING: AN EXTENSION OF AC/RC INTEGRATION

It is not so much the mode of formation as the proper combined use of the different arms which will insure victory.

- Antoine Henri Jomini

BACKGROUND

There is a noticeable lack of mentoring across the US Army Components and it is having an impact on the overall success of the Army. Every year the Components get further away from this simple task is another generation that will not pass on the traditions of experienced leadership. It would be advantageous for officers, regardless of component, to seek both an RC and an AC mentor. This would serve several purposes for both components. First is the obvious relationship that needs to be maintained and nurtured through the mentoring process of junior and senior officers. Second, it would broaden the integration of the "One Army" concept by providing senior officers with a forum to expand their knowledge across all components. Finally, both the mentor and the protégé would benefit from the experience of both components to broaden their strategic vision of the Army. The lack of this specific mentoring can affect AC/RC integration. Both the Active Component and the Reserve Components have an inherent responsibility to the military profession and continued AC/RC integration to mentor across their respective components.

Mentoring is defined in Webster's dictionary as the action of a trusted guide and counselor. In the military it is used in conjunction with coaching as traits of a good leader when developing subordinates to become future leaders. The military encourages mentoring and provides some guidance on its use to promote the development of its junior leaders and the continued growth of the military profession. "Mentoring (in the Army) is the proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity. Mentoring is an inclusive process (not an exclusive one) for everyone under a leader's charge."¹ Along with FM 22-100, Army Leadership, the US Army provides the following manuals to assist leaders with mentoring both military and civilian personnel. These manuals appropriately address their target audience to include the Reserve Component, but fail to proscribe mentoring across Active and Reserve Components.

- AR 600-100. *ARMY LEADERSHIP*. 17 September 1993.
- DA Pam 350-58. *Leader Development for America's Army*. 13 October 1994.

- DA Pam 600-3. *Commissioned Officer Development*. 01 October 1998.
- DA Pam 600-11. *Warrant Officer Professional Development*. 30 December 1996.
- DA Pam 600-25. *US Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide*. 30 April 1987.
- DA Pam 690-46. *Mentoring for Civilian Members of the Force*. 31 July 1995

Mentoring creates a unique relationship and should not be confused with coaching or teaching. "Mentoring functions are those aspects of a developmental relationship that enhance both individuals' growth and advancement. These functions are the essential characteristics that differentiate developmental relationships from other work relationships."² This is a mutually beneficial relationship for the mentor and the protégé that enhances career advancement and, more importantly, an improved sense of job satisfaction. "FM 22-100 emphasizes self-development and development of subordinates. It includes performance indicators to help leaders assess the values, attributes, skills, and actions that the rest of the manual discusses. It discusses developmental counseling, a skill all Army leaders must perfect so they can mentor their subordinates and leave their organization and people better than they found them."³ A mentor is usually senior to the person being mentored, and will focus their mentoring on career development at a time when the junior person is transitioning laterally or vertically through organizational positions. These transitions are illustrated by a junior officer receiving the first assignment or a staff officer transferring to a higher level of staff and command structure.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENCE FOR INTEGRATION

The history of our nation has many examples of the importance of the integration of the Active and the Reserve Components. While there are some examples that illustrate the poor integration of militia or reserve forces with the regulars or active forces, it is widely accepted that integration can contribute to turning the momentum of battle or increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the total force in combat. The United States Army has understood the importance of integration since the Continental Army first used the colonial militia during our fight for independence. General George Washington recognized this when he commented at Bunker Hill that the militia was more trouble than it was worth, but he never lost sight of their potential value as a force multiplier when properly prepared, integrated, and mentored. He also understood the importance of the militia to the individual colonies soon to be recognized as the United States. The connection between the militia and the Continental Army was symbolic of the colonies' contributions to the uniting of this new nation.

The Civil War provides many examples of the integration of Regulars (later known as Active Component) and militia (later known as Reserve Component) forces. This war of ideas challenged the foundation of our country. The North and South represented different ideas about how this country should be governed, and became the call to service that led to the integration of military power on both sides. The countless militias that formed the units and armies on either side of this war provided the historical basis for future implementation of AC/RC operations. Of particular note was the performance of the North's militias from New York, Pennsylvania, and Maine; they worked together to hold and turn back the attack of the Army of Northern Virginia at the battle of Gettysburg. This integrated effort became a turning point in the campaign.

It is important for the United States to promote its national values by not appearing to be a belligerent country with a large standing army. It is within that context that after we have expanded the Army to meet the demands of conflict, we have subsequently drawn down the Army to pre-war levels. The basis for the buildup to war has always come from the Reserve Components, consisting of a National Guard and Reserves. Their units have often been supplemented by other citizen soldiers, either volunteers or conscripts, but the RC provided an initial trained pool or structure. Having this Reserve Components available provides reassurance to the American people and strength to the Active Component during "steady state" operations and wars

Both world wars exceeded the capabilities of the Active Component through the concept of unlimited war that resulted in the full mobilization of the nation. During the early stages of these wars, active duty units deployed into the theater while the Reserve Components forces provided support and began training for combat employment. Victory was ultimately obtained through the integrated efforts of the total force that included all components. This united front in war was a reflection of the nation and its values represented by the many Reserve Components units from throughout the United States, mentored by the Active Component participating in these wars, and complemented by a huge number of inductees and an even greater number of civilians working in the factories and farms that sustained the war machine.

The Cold War era followed World War II and the concept of limited war as part of the nation's containment strategy became the norm during the Korean and Vietnam Conflicts. This limitation on the application of the military aspect of national power to enforce national interests met with less than decisive results. This was a time when the Active Component operated with modest support from the Reserve Component, during the Korean War, or with very little assistance, on the battlefields of Vietnam. The lack of Reserve Components forces augmenting

Active Component operations highlighted the unintended separation of the military from the ideals and values at all levels of American society. The high level of acceptance and commitment by citizens through their participation during World War II as reserve forces or patriotic citizens was now replaced by a government and military that functioned with conscripted citizens on their behalf. This decreased inter-dependence and contact across components and virtually eliminated the opportunities to mentor across components.

TOTAL FORCE POLICY

The United States military has relied on the Total Force Policy to integrate the Active and Reserve Components and produce a balanced mix of an all-volunteer force. This policy followed the demobilization of conscripted forces after the Vietnam era and facilitated the United States Military's increased effectiveness as an element of national power.

The correct mix of forces at the decisive point on the battlefield has been the challenge of every Army. The integration of Active Component and Reserve Components is the total Army's effort to maximize this principle while expanding the force, but managing to do so on an ever decreasing budget. The continuing evolution of military power from the Continental Army of 1775 to the joint force of today has been characterized by an increasing degree of integration. Our basic national values have not changed since the writing of the Declaration of Independence, but our national interest and military strategy has changed due to the evolution of our military power and the country. Lessons from History, either through the study of theories of warfare or its actual implementations and execution, have been integrated into the doctrine of today. During this time, mentoring as a function of integration and tool for professional development has drawn increased interest and eventually became doctrine that reinforced the Total Force Policy.

Our national interests are designed to ensure a free and secure nation, economic prosperity, and the promotion of democracy, and are directly tied to our national values that have become the model of a free society. Throughout our history, our national strategy has been challenged in different ways, depending on the enemy that we had to fight. The current global war on terrorism has led us to review the policies that form our strategic national interest. "In the war against global terrorism, we will never forget that we are alternately fighting for our democratic values and way of life."⁴ Military power, as one element of national power, provides the "means" of this nation to defend and promote its interests. The military services that provide this power are a delicate combination of soldiers, airmen, seamen and marines that make-up the Active and Reserve components. Integration of these components has become the measure

of our success on the battlefield and as a profession of arms. Within the context of an “all volunteer” force, the Reserve Components is a snapshot of the people living values and supporting the legislation that reinforce our way of life. The Active Component, as the full-time and primary element of our national defense and military power, executes this power at the discretion of our government, less concerned with the “why”, but focused on the “where” and “when”. The impact to our national strategy will depend on a renewed Total Force Policy that provides focus to the mix and balance of continuous integration between these two components.

The Total Force Policy initiated in the early 1970's by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird has transitioned from combat and combat support to focus on combat support roles in the current policies that form our national military strategy. This policy grew over the years to include a comprehensive set of programs and initiatives to increase the readiness and the efficiency of the Reserve Components when called to active service. The Cold War created the recognition that a total force of integrated Active and Reserve Components would increase the operational efficiency of the military and would lead to increased national power. The policy has been successful through its programs in creating a Total Force; programs include AC/RC exchange programs, Multi-component units and assignments, Integrated Divisions, and Training Support XXI. The reduced attention to the total force policy may signal that the integration of Active and Reserve Components is complete, and that both components operate from a platform of balance. The life cycle of this policy, however, is currently focused on the metrics of its effectiveness and recommended changes to extend means for reaching of its goals. If we are to move on from this policy, then we should also implement programs that support and maintain the balance at its current level.

CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

The Civil-Military relationship within the U.S. rests on a concept of shared and separate powers, and is symbolic of the integration of components. The constitution reflects our fear that if the military is allowed to evolve without the influence of the society that it is designed to defend, it would develop tendencies to obtain more power and would corrupt its primary mission to defend the nation. Military subordination to civilian control as an essential element of our democracy is balanced by the integration of civilians into the military as volunteers for the Active and Reserve Components forces. Another benefit of this relationship is that society, through its RC members, is brought directly to bear on the actions of the nation to defend its national interest. The Reserve Components, also known as “citizen soldiers”, often possess unique skills

as soldiers derived from civilian jobs, in both large and small towns, and include such diverse occupations as bus drivers, teachers, lawyers, pastors, and police officers to name a few. They are derived from the entire nation and represent the sentiments of those areas of our country because they live there when at peace and return to them when their mobilization is complete. The Active Component has less home town grounding due in part to long-term field exercises, operational deployments, and periodic permanent change on stations (PCS). Cross-component mentoring would produce relationships that would allow sharing and appreciation of these differences through increased social interaction, while also focusing on unity of effort.

Participation by Reserve Component forces through integration into current operations creates national interest in the activity of the military. The effect is very different than experienced in the Vietnam War, where drafted citizen soldiers were not in "community based" units. The Executive Branch of the government, within the context of a "limited war", made the decision to use only Active Component forces. The result of this decision magnified the appearance that military and government actions were arbitrary, in direct contrast with some societal perspectives, and created a false appearance of independent exercise of power. The military lost credibility, which led to widespread protest and a dissipation of the respect between members of the civil-military relationship.

The military profession recognizes the importance of subordination to civilian control and that the military's most important asset is its people. "A military professional cannot operate independently from the state or the society he or she serves. Whether the service it is to an authoritarian or Democratic state or to something in between, the service is embedded in a social context which forms the basis for a set of relationships." ⁵ The connection between the nation's people and the military power that defends its interests has often been noted as the core of our democracy's success, and has led to legislation that has improved and matured the all-volunteer force. As a profession, we recognize and endeavored to pursue the evolution of this relationship from "limited war" through the Total Force to Joint operations and Transformation.

The benefits and advantages of our all-volunteer "total force" have produced an open environment that integrates the Active Component into the fabric of today's society. "Military professionals must recognize the importance of fostering links with society to ensure that the military never becomes an entity separate from society, but remains always of society." ⁶ This all-volunteer force is a balanced interdependent mix of Active and Reserve Components that brings together the power of the military and the will of the people as mediated by elected

officials. The "Draft" is no longer an option that the U.S. military or the government would want to entertain for modern warfare except under extreme circumstances.

Our success as a nation, as the lone superpower, has demonstrated that this civil-military relationship is appropriate for a free and democratic nation. This relationship requires constant attention that can be facilitated by mentoring to improve the relationships necessary to support the total force policy. Active participation by the civilian control and the military profession is required for the efficient execution of operations. Orders by the president or legislation from Congress require interaction with the military profession to adequately address the needs of both sides. The benefit of this interaction is the legislation that has resulted after high levels of integration or the need to improve the integration between the Active and Reserve Components. Legislation that has sought to improve integration has come in the form of Public Law that provides coverage to Reserve Components forces under Servicemen Group Life Insurance, or provides employment protection through the Servicemember's Civil Relief Act. Other legislation sought to improve the overall function of the military and the civil-military relationship. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has led to the current changes throughout the Department of Defense, creating more effective joint operations and improved interagency coordination.⁷ Finally, the current version of the UCMJ now provides soldiers with a more comprehensive legal system that is a direct result of this integration. The constant interaction between civilian authority and military power is interwoven at all levels, and it is through this relationship that the power and limitations of the military are executed.

Active and Reserve Components integration through mentoring provides another forum to expand service members education and maintain military links with society. The Active Component culture is tied to the post where its soldiers are assigned, and is further localized through soldier and leadership development from their respective units. The elements that influence this tight knit group range from post chain of commands to national and international events. Until called to active service, such as by a partial mobilization, the Reserve Components operate day-to-day in a community civilian environment. This is further defined by their attention to the professional or vocational execution of their civilian jobs and the ever changing legislative and economic landscape that affects their income, housing, and education.

Through the organization, culture, and structure of the Reserve Components, the Active Component binds U.S. society to the military profession. This binding creates an inherent responsibility to provide the motivation to educate officers at all levels. "Studies reviewing the curricula at the pre-commissioning and senior service college levels of professional military education reveal that the fundamental principles related to civil-military norms are poorly

understood at the undergraduate level." ⁸ The more exposure and better understanding the military has to social political norms, the better able they are to proactively react to changes. This requires the military profession to seek ways to expand this education and thereby increase the quality of the civil-military relationship.

The term "Twice the citizen" defines the nature of the public and national service of the Reserve Components- a civilian by necessity and a military professional when preparing for and called to service. Continued and expanded integration of the Active and Reserve Components would provide advantages to the total force. The most obvious advantage would be a responsive and reliable force to meet the demands of current operations, with the added benefit of helping AC soldiers better understand current societal norms and increase their civilian interaction. Operations in the Middle East have indicated that this increased understanding has become invaluable as the need for civil affairs skills, regardless of military occupational specialty, are required for all phases of combat and post combat operations.

ANALYSIS

MENTORING WITHIN THE COMPONENTS

Relying on available doctrine and written literature, focused toward counseling versus mentoring, most leaders prefer to counsel subordinates rather than to mentor them. "Despite the widespread interest in mentoring and hopes that it presents potential for addressing a myriad of problems, the concept is not well understood within the Army."⁹ There is a lack of attention to the benefits of mentoring and developing personal/professional relationships, and more of an emphasis on OER counseling, due to its administrative burden on command and requirement for readiness status reporting. Leaders are required to maintain meticulous logs of counseling sessions with detailed comments about ratings, and the next counseling session. Entire staff sections devote administrative time assisting the leader with this process. However, the misapplication of effort leads many leaders to believe that they are fully engaged in a mentoring relationship when in fact they are only carrying out the counseling duties of a responsible leader and efficient bureaucrat.

Another contributing factor to the lack of mentoring is the perception that it is a function that requires an investment of time for personal introspection and commitment that is reserved for a few. "The Army has debated the importance of mentoring with the meaning, specifically Army mentoring, at the root of the debate. Doctrine articulates mentoring as an improving action of leadership, while advocating mentorship as inclusive for all. In the corporate and academic worlds mentoring is by nature exclusive. Dissatisfaction exists in the Force due to a lack of

mentorship because the expectation is mentoring for all. Many perceive mentorship negatively because the opportunity for mentoring has not been available for all.”¹⁰ The few examples that we have been provided for mentoring have only included an exclusive group of officers.¹¹

Regardless of the techniques or the misperceptions of mentoring, many senior leaders use coaching, teaching, and counseling, which are all functions of mentoring, to build developmental relationships with many junior leaders. It is more likely that junior leaders refer to senior leaders as mentors than senior leaders refer to junior leaders as someone that they are mentoring. This is the result of poor mentoring guidance that produces perceived risk on the part of the senior leaders and places mentoring in the background of individual and career development, and allows unnecessary priority to individual career protection.

DOCTRINE

Current Army doctrine promotes mentoring among Officers, NCOs, and DA Civilians. “The development of competent and confident military and civilian leaders in the Army — from corporal to sergeant major, from lieutenant to general officer, and from civilian intern to senior executive service — is our most enduring legacy to the future of the Army and the nation.”¹² This doctrine, however, fails to recognize the need for cross component mentoring and its impact on AC/RC integration as a legacy that develops long-term relationships. Outside of sustained operations, where both components share the load, the Active and Reserve Components will retain their current separation. Increased exposure between the components, through sustained operations, increases operational readiness and develops tactical skills in the Reserve Components necessary to our National Defense Strategy.

Budgetary constraints and Transformation has forced DoD to rely on a balanced and integrated Active and Reserve Total Force. “Our national strategy requires a multi-mission capable force of AC and RC units trained to serve as an effective part of the joint and combined force within whatever timelines are set for the unit.”¹³ These motivations and opportunities to mentor across the components should not be lost. Any effort to encourage mentoring across the components through expanded doctrine, direct guidance from senior leadership, or a call to action by motivated mentors would have a lasting impact on AC/RC integration.

Army doctrine as the foundation of leadership, training, readiness, and combat operations should be expanded to include mentoring across the Active and Reserve Components. “Leader development must be doctrinally based.”¹⁴ The intent of this doctrine is to provide guidelines for the successful development of leaders in all components of the military with the capacity for

increased responsibility and future senior leader positions that culminates in organizational success for the military element of national power.

CONCLUSION

If we look at mentoring as a tool to develop individual growth and advancement that benefits the protégé as well as the mentor, then on a larger scale we can use mentoring across components as a means to grow and advance the Active and Reserve Components beyond integration into a seamless Total Force. The expansion of current doctrine to include steps and guidance for cross-component mentoring will provide the foundation that will sustain this developmental process as an institution within the Army profession.

The recent publications of the annual report to the President and the Congress by the Secretary of Defense¹⁵ confirm that Transformation will produce the Ways to a total force. To that end, the goals for this new force will be characterized by responsiveness, deployability, agility, versatility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability for all segments of our national defense. It is not just the war fighting element, but also the support, acquisition, civilian, and interagency elements of our national defense, that are critical to this transition. Transformation acknowledges the participation of the Reserve Components in current operations as an equal and full partner in national military strategy. This is evident in that more than 40% of combat forces from the Reserve Components currently mobilized in support of operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom. As transformation continues, the total force will benefit from the strengths of Active and Reserve Components integration within an all-volunteer force.

We cannot ignore the lessons from history. Today's threats from terrorist and radical insurgents operating without borders and within nation states do not lend themselves to unlimited war. Evolving warfare and a Transforming military provide the motivation to initiate enduring developmental relationships. We must continue to pursue mentoring doctrine that will promote an integrated force and balance the strengths of our national defense to implement our national strategy. Elements of the Total Force Policy should be used to encourage new members of both components to maintain the current maturity level of today's integration, and can be used as a metric for improvement.

RECOMMENDATION

The Army should promote the integration of the Active and Reserve Components through mentoring to strengthen our national military strategy, and improve the effectiveness of our national power through a stronger military profession. This should begin at the highest levels of the Department of Defense where cross-component interaction is common to mission success.

It can then be recommended to commanders and senior officers at all levels, AC and RC, to set the example by initiating this mentoring process. It should not be a mandatory program, but rather guidance to initiate the process with the intent that this will lead to a developmental mentoring relationship instead of meeting a mentoring quota. Metrics for this process will result in efficient integration of AC/RC forces as a response to mentor knowledge of components and protégés ability to assume increased leadership responsibility.

The current policy of Transformation recognizes the symbiotic nature of the Active and Reserve Components, and provides the best platform for its continued growth during a new century and a complicated threat environment. Integration will increase by breaking down barriers that separate the components, consolidating infrastructure, and instituting a common language between the components. This policy, combined with new doctrine, will strengthen the Active Component through increased operational support from the Reserve Components that would focus mission accomplishment and increase its overall effectiveness in supporting the national military strategy.

New doctrine should be built by expanding FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, Army Relationships. The doctrine should establish the initial working relationships between priority RC units and AC units with shared mission and geographic locations, factors promoting unit training and readiness. Chapter 3, section 3 of this regulation provides a comprehensive list of mentoring actions, but falls short of providing specific guidance, below the General Officer Command level, to fully exploit the impact of mentoring at all levels of AC/RC interaction. This doctrine should include guidance, down to company grade level, for cross-component mentoring as a developmental tool that promotes AC/RC integration. It should be a responsibility for both Active and Reserve leaders to seek opportunities across their respective components to set the conditions that foster a mentoring relationship. Conditions such as AC/RC training exercises, AC/RC assignments, unit to unit mentoring programs, and current GWOT operations provide the interaction that supports a mentoring relationship. This doctrine will promote mentoring at the lowest effective level and seek guidance from senior leaders that will focus mentoring actions on recommended current topics such as joint operations, transformation, and lessons learned from combat operations.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Department of the Army, *Army Leadership Be, Know, Do*, Field Manual 22-100, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 31 August 1999), 5-16.

² Kathy E. Kram, *Mentoring at Work*, (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1985), 22.

³ Field Manual 22-100, 5-15.

⁴ Executive Office of the President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2002), 7.

⁵ Lloyd J. Matthews, ed, *The Future of the Army Profession*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 246.

⁶ Ibid., 265.

⁷ Ibid., 232.

⁸ Ibid., 248.

⁹ Gregg F. Martin, et al., "The Road to Mentoring: Paved with Good Intentions," *Parameters* 32 (Autumn 2002): 1.

¹⁰ Bette R. Washington, *Mentorship: An Army Dilemma* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2002), abstract.

¹¹ Martin, et al., 3.

¹² Department of the Army, *Leader Development for America's Army*, Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 13 October 1994), 1.

¹³ Department of the Army, *Army Relationships*, FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, Forces Command, 20 July 2000), 5.

¹⁴ Department of the Army, *Warrant Officer Professional Development*, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-11, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 30 December 1996), 3.

¹⁵ Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2002), 63.

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